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INTRODUCTION 
57 
In recent years much stress has been put on accommodating 'difference' in British 
education. This ranges from trying to tackle assumed differences between the ways in 
which boys, girls and children from ethnic minorities learn, to teaching tolerance of 
different/other cultures. Attempts to accommodate such differences form part of a 
liberal/progressive approach to providing a just education that does not simply cater 
for the dominant group (white) or the highest achieving group (white girls). This push 
towards providing equitable treatment in education manifests itself in both 
pedagogical strategies and, more importantly for this paper, the inclusion of curricular 
content that will incorporate an understanding of 'other' cultures. The thinking on 
these issues tends to reflect a set of metaphysical assumptions about difference: 
differences across ethnicity and gender are seen as being 'present'. 
The aim of this paper is to question metaphysical assumptions about 'otherness' 
by focusing principally on Derrida's discussion of this issue; Judith Butler's early 
work on gender (influenced by Derrida's philosophy) also makes an appearance. 
Derrida argues that a metaphysical understanding of difference/otherness represents a 
failure to account for the otherness within language itself. For Derrida, 
difference/otherness is not something that is simply 'there' but is performed through a 
language that (in various complex ways) is other to itself. Through drawing attention 
to the 'phonocentrism' and 'logocentrism'} of dominant Western traditions of thought, 
he shows how the fullness (the 'presence') so often ascribed to 'sameness' and 
'otherness' is an effect of language-a linguistic performance (Butler calls this 
perfonnativity). In this paper, I argue that the liberal/progressive goal of 
accommodating difference is undermined by its failure to recognise the performative 
aspects of otherness/difference. The last section of the paper includes a reading (found 
in the National Curriculum for England and Wales) of the distinction between courses 
of study based on an 'English Literary Heritage' and 'Texts from Other Cultures and 
Traditions'. However it will first be necessary to discuss some dominant themes that 
emerge from Derrida's work in the philosophy of language. 
PHONOCENTRISM, LOGOCENTRISM AND THE MARK 
Let us begin by considering what Derrida has to say about the phonocentrism which 
he believes characterises the history of the philosophy of language, indeed, the history 
of thinking generally. Here is Derrida: 
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The system of "hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak" through the phonic 
substance which presents itself as the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore 
nonempirical or noncontingent signifier-has necessarily dominated the history 
of the world during an entire epoch, and has even produced the idea of the world, 
the idea of world origin, that arises from the difference between the worldly and 
the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and nonideality, universal and 
nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical, etc. 
With an irregular and essentially precarious success, this movement would have 
apparently tended, as toward its telos, to confine writing to a secondary and 
instrumental function: translator of a full speech that was fully present (present to 
itself, to its signified, to the other, the very condition of the theme of presence in 
general), technics in the service of language, spokesman, interpreter of an 
originary speech itself shielded from interpretation (Derrida, 1997, pp. 7-8). 
When we speak we feel a closeness to our words, a command over them, a sense of 
control. Therefore, the spoken word does not seem isolated from its utterance, unlike 
the written word, which already seems to render a sense of dislocation. When we 
speak, our words 'seem' to register something internal whereas writing 'feels' 
external, distant and supplementary. Therefore speech appears to be present to 
thought whereas, in contrast, writing seems to embody absence. When we read a book, 
the author is not there, we cannot speak to him. Also, the things, which the words 
refer to, are not in front of us. We might therefore say that writing (conceived of in 
the traditional sense) connotes absence and therefore otherness in relation to our 
words. We will come back to this shortly. 
Related to the phonocentrism described above is a certain logocentrism. To think 
logocentrically is to adhere to a belief in truth that is beyond or above history. This 
vision of truth sees various truths as having the quality of metaphysical presence that 
is internal to them. Such truth is 'internal' and therefore superior to all forms of 
'exteriority' whether they are cultural, historical or textual. It seems obvious that 
language originates with speech-we speak before we can write! It therefore appears 
equally obvious that speech is somehow closer to the logos. 
As has been more or less implicitly determined, the essence of the phone would 
be immediately proximate to that which within "thought" as logos relates to 
"meaning", produces it, receives it, speaks it, "composes" it. If, for Aristotle, for 
example, spoken words (ta en te phone) are the symbols of mental experience 
(pathemata tes psyches) (de interpretatione, 1, 16a 3) it is because the voice, 
producer of the first symbols, has a relationship of essential and immediate 
proximity with the mind (p. 11). 
As mentioned earlier, when we speak we get the impression that our speaking reflects 
an outpouring of our thoughts. Spoken words are therefore 'symbols' of our thoughts. 
This way of thinking creates a hierarchy in which thought (logos) comes first, 
followed by speech and then writing: before history, knowledge and culture, there is 
presence. Plato's writing on 'the forms' provides a clear example of logocentrism-
the very goal of philosophy is the reappropriation of presence that can only take place 
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(in however partial a fashion) if one seeks to commune with the eternal forms. The 
text as such, is only an aid/supplement to this process. 
To show how Derrida provides a critique of phonocentrism and logocentrism, it 
will be helpful at this point to introduce Saussure and his theory of the linguistic sign. 
The sign, according to Saussure, is made up of the signifier (an 'acoustic image') and 
the signified (a concept). Language is a structure made up of signs. For Saussure, the 
signifier is in an arbitrary relationship with the signified-there is nothing 'cowish' 
about the word 'cow'. Language is structured according to differences-' cat' is 
different from 'bat' by one letter, and this difference in the signifier leads to two 
completely different signifieds. It should be noted that Saussure's theory is clearly 
phonocentric: 
In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined strictly 
as sense (thought or lived) or more loosely as thing. All signifiers, and first and 
foremost the written signifier, are derivative with regard to what would wed the 
voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to 
the thing itself (p. 11). 
For Saussure, the signified belongs to/is located in the mind. Because the voice seems 
more immediately connected to our thoughts, it is closer to the signified. 
Consequently, the 'notion of the sign always implies within itself the distinction 
between signifier and signified, even. if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished 
simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within 
the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of 
voice and being, of voice and the ideality of meaning' (p. 12). 
Derrida's reading of Saussure is not wholly critical. Let us set this out 
schematically: 
1. Derrida agrees with Saussure that the linguistic sign is arbitrary, but argues that 
Saussure fails to account for the implications of this. Having seen that there is 
nothing cowish about the word 'cow', Saussure turns away from the more radical 
possibilities that accompany this recognition and turns toward the logocentric 
assumption that there is some fullness of meaning that exists behind the sign, 
which is then embodied in speech. 
2. Derrida argues that if we take Saussure's argument to its logical conclusion, then 
the arbitrariness demonstrated by the latter demonstrates a dislocation, a 
fundamental otherness that characterises the relationship between the mark of the 
signifier and the content of the signified-in this sense the signified is, in an 
original sense, absent from the mark. 
3. To go one stage further, if we can only think in words, and yet our words as 
referents bear no necessary relationship to their meaning, then the logocentric 
hierarchy (thoughts-speech spoken words-writing as supplement) is in a sense 
inverted. It would seem that the mark comes first. 
4. If we take this logical reordering seriously, then it would seem that 'full presence' 
is in fact an illusory effect of language (or something produced by language). 
Meaning is not out there waiting to be worded. Rather, words as they come into 
being word the world. Consequently, the signifier does not represent the signified, 
but brings it into 'presence'-brings it into being as an effect. 
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5. Therefore, the figure of the linguistic sign (with its unity linking signifier and 
signified) is no longer adequate to the task of understanding how language works, 
and Derrida replaces the figure of the sign with that of the 'mark'. The 'mark' is 
an indicator of absence rather than presence. It exists in the form of the trace, the 
graphic representation of the word prior to its signification. 
To summarise, Derrida's discussion of the mark demonstrates the unravelling of the 
binary distinction between speech (as indicative of presence) and writing (as 
supplement). This distinction depended on the passage from fully present non-
linguistic truth passing through into the words of the speaking subject present to that 
truth. This subject could then tum to the supplementary function of writing. However, 
if the 'mark' comes first, then, in a sense, writing comes first. However, our 
understandings of presence, speech and writing have all suffered a sea change-
writing can no longer be thought of as simply the secondary representation of speech. 
Speech is not bound to 'presence', as 'presence' is an effect of the mark. When 
Derrida talks about 'writing' he is referring to a 'general' writing, which need not be 
thought of as the word on the page. So, for example, a social group whose culture 
does not involve writing (in the traditional sense) is still subject to writing in the 
general sense. The fact that the mark may not take a materialised form is, in a sense, 
immaterial. So, when Levi Strauss maintains that African tribes, because they do not 
write (in the traditional sense) are in some ways more innocent than Westerners, he 
fails to recognise the general writing, the 'markness' that characterises their language. 
THE OTHERING OF THE OTHER 
The account as it has so far been developed strips language of its otherness in regards 
to metaphysical/logocentric truth. Truth as such is produced by language rather than 
being anterior to it. Therefore notions of difference understood in essentialist terms 
have been undermined, as truth must now be conceived of as a linguistic 
'performance' of some kind. At this point it might be useful to consider how Judith 
Butler's treatment of the term 'performativity' demonstrates how identity is bound up 
with a form of linguistic performance. In this citation from Butler, she acknowledges 
her debt to Derrida: 
I originally took my clue on how to read the performativity of gender from 
Jacques Derrida's reading of Kafka's 'Before the Law'. There the one who waits 
for the law, sits before the door of the law, attributes a certain force to the law for 
which one waits. The anticipation of an authoritative disclosure of meaning is the 
means by which that authority is attributed and installed: the anticipation conjures 
its object. I wondered whether we do not labor under a similar expectation 
concerning gender, that it operates as an interior essence that might be disclosed, 
an expectation that ends up producing the very phenomenon that it anticipates. In 
the first instance, then, the performativity of gender revolves around this 
metalepsis, the way in which the anticipation of a gendered essence produces that 
which it posits as outside itself. Secondly, performativity is not a singular act, but 
a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the 
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context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration 
(Butler, 1999-s 2p. xiv-xy).2 
I want to highlight several features of Butler's understanding of performativity. 
Firstly, she clearly establishes a connection between foundationalist approaches to 
knowledge and legality, therefore emphasising the problematic aspects of a tradition 
that makes truth claims coterminous with fixity. 'Knowledge' as regards gender is 
shown to be the effect of a performance that she calls 'conjuration' ,3 emphasising the 
magical aspects of a process that performs its own essence, which is then made 
external and originary. Butler sees the 'invocation' of performativity as very much an 
ethical matter. For Butler, language performs us; various discourses designate who 
and what we are. This understanding of performativity has an ethical dimension 
because it works against essentialistic or biologistic performative discourses. Of 
course the biologization of difference is no neutral phenomenon. The inscription of 
biological determinants into language, will invariably favour the dominant group-
usually the white western male. Consequently, the history of the West is characterised 
by various discourses of superiority and inferiority, often hidden by a sugar-coating of 
positive connotations-black people are good at music and sport, but are they fit for 
political office? Women are pretty and delicate, but do they have the stomach for 
business? . 
THE 'OTHERNESS' INTERNAL TO LANGUAGE 
So, we have seen how language produces difference. Nevertheless, we cannot help 
but recognise the fact that plenty of people are unwilling to accept the various roles 
allotted to them by the linguistic construction of difference, not that any of us fully 
escape or stand outside these discursive parameters. Butler argues that language 
performs us as subjects in ways that are both negative and positive; in its performative 
capacity, language can 'do us in,4 just as it can 'do' (create). Of course, the fact that 
words do not necessarily do us in needs to be accounted for. To explain this requires a 
discussion of the otherness internal to language. 
To consider what is meant by an otherness internal to language, it will help to 
briefly return to the notion of difference employed by Saussure. As we have seen 
Saussure locates difference in accordance with the distinction between different 
signifiers and their related 'signifieds'. Once we see that these differences no longer 
reflect some metaphysical ordering then difference must be understood as something 
internal to language. Words/concepts differ as effects of language. Therefore what a 
mark/word is depends upon all the other marks/words that it is not. Consequently 
every word is 'haunted' by what it is not-and must therefore in one sense be 
radically dislocated and 'other' to itself. Derrida refers to this general difference, prior 
to all subsequent differences as 'differance', a term he invents. The difference 
between 'difference' and 'differance' only works (in French as in English) because 
the distinction is inaudible. In choosing to spell the word differently, Derrida is 
making a point about the priorness of writing (conceived of in the new way described 
earlier). 
Now, we might say that Butler's discussion of the performativity of gender reveals 
the otherness internal to our words in the sense that femininity or blackness comes to 
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represent whatever masculinity or blackness is not. We might therefore say that 
whatever whiteness 'is' is dependant on blackness. Blackness is 'internal' to 
whiteness. This is one dimension of what Derrida refers to as the madness of 
language-all words are hunted/haunted by other words internal to their very 
possibility of meaning anything. The other dimension of differance can only be 
accounted for if we move beyond a synchronic picture of language, to a diachronic 
picture of language in use. As Derrida notes, for words to mean anything at all they 
have to be repeatable and repeated, iterable and reiterated; they have to be 'used' and 
used over time. 
In linguistics the study of pragmatics concerns itself with language in use. 
Linguists who adopt pragmatics as a model recognise that issues pertaining to 
semantics and grammar are insufficient when it comes to explaining meaning. If we 
are to determine whether an utterance is successful or not then we must understand 
how it is used in context. So for example if we take the phrase 'would you like a cup 
of coffee', when said in a coffee shop will mean 'would you like a cup of coffee'. 
However, if two people meet in a bar and whilst walking home, one says to the other; 
'would you like a cup of coffee', then the meaning is quite different. 
This all sounds very convincing. However, thinking in this way often leads to 
what we might see as a simultaneously overdetermined and underdetermined 
approach to the role played by context. For Derrida, words are subject to an internal 
force and movement. It is not the case that any single context determines the force of 
words. Rather, an unlimited number of possible contexts are internal to the words 
themselves. Therefore, the word or concept is never at one with itself, it is always 
other to itself. Derrida insists that he is referring not to the polysemy (the multiple 
meanings) of language but to its iterability. If we perceive the forces in language to be 
external, then the context determines meaning. This control of context and therefore 
meaning is central to the tradition that has given speech a particular dominance in the 
linguistic hierarchy over writing. By showing that words carry their contexts with 
them, Derrida demonstrates that the fullness and completeness, the presence ascribed 
to the speech situation is never fully realised; never mind the force of the present 
context, the words will not allow it (how much confusion has been caused by coffee?). 
Here is Derrida: 
[A] written sign carries with it a force that breaks with its context, that is, with the 
collectivity of presences organizing the moment of its inscription. This breaking 
force (jorce de rupture) is not an accidental predicate but the very structure of the 
written text ... by virtue of its essential iterability, a written syntagma can always 
be detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given without causing it to 
lose all possibility of functioning, if not all possibility of 'communicating' 
precisely. One can perhaps come to recognise other possibilities in it by grafting 
it onto other chains. No context can entirely enclose it. Nor any code, the code 
here being both the possibility and impossibility of writing, of its essential 
iterability (repetition/alterity) (Derrida, 1988, p. 9). 
For Butler, drawing on Derrida, the iterability of language means that the same words 
or forms of discourse can find themselves in all manner of contexts in which they may 
do damage or act creatively; consider the reappropriation of the words 'nigger' and 
'queer'. 5 It is therefore significant that the wordness or graphematic quality of 
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language be recognised. There is a decided danger in viewing language as 'doing' 
something in an absolute and full sense, thereby dissolving/deferring the linguistic 
aspect of language. It is the fixity of the law as it applies to language that Butler finds 
most dangerous: 
Those who seek to fix with certainty the links between certain speech acts and 
their injurious effects will surely lament the open temporality of the speech act. 
That no speech act has to perform injury as its effect means that no simple 
elaboration of speech acts will provide a standard by which the injuries of speech 
might be effectively adjudicated. Such a loosening between act and injury, 
however, opens up the possibility for a counter-speech, a kind of talking back, 
that would be foreclosed by the tightening of that link. Thus the gap that separates 
the speech act from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a 
theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relentless search for 
remedy (Butler, 1997, p. 15). 
The iterability of language (the fact that language is not at one with itself) makes 
room for the unexpected-what Derrida calls the arrivant. A 'written syntagma can 
always be detached from the chain in which it is inserted' and therefore words 
regularly find themselves in surprisingly new territory. It is the iterability of language 
that makes room for counter-speech and a new set of linguistic performances that 
undermine fixed categories of sameness and otherness. 
ORIENTALISM 
We have already seen how the iterability within language makes words other to 
themselves. Indeed we have also considered the ways in which language produces the 
effects of metaphysical presence that serves to mask the otherness internal to 
language. Part of this linguistic operation involves the production of conceptual 
difference-concepts take on the appearance of separate, different entities that exist in 
the ether (in the abstract). Of course, as both Derrida and Butler show, not only does 
this effect of difference establish identities; it also establishes a hierarchy of identity 
reflective of power relations within society/language. However, the disorder/otherness 
internal to language that accompanies its iterability, in undermining the effects of 
presence, allows for the emergence of the arrivant.6 Words are not under our direct 
control and can take us somewhere else. We can see an example of this in Edward 
Said's use of the term 'Orientalism'. 
For Said, the Orientalist believes that he is studying the 'Orient' in some sort of 
objective fashion that treats the 'Orient' as though it were an 'inert fact of nature' 
(Footnote). In contrast to the Orientalist, Said begins with the assumption that the 
Orient is 'not merely there just as the Occident is not just there either' (Said, 1986, p. 
4). He argues that: 
Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a 
collective notion identifying 'us' as against all 'those' non-Europeans, and indeed 
© 2009 The Author 
64 IAN MUNDAY 
it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what 
made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European 
identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and 
cultures. There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, 
themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness (p. 7). 
Said shows how the Western distinction between Orient and. Occident represents the 
construction of differences at a distance. He shows how the Orientalist, believing that 
he is engaged in a descriptive activity contributes to the performance of difference. 
What the Orientalist fails to see is that the differences produced by differance are 
differences internal to the creation of the discourse of the West-what the Orient 'is' 
is what the Occident is not. The very production of a narrative of We sternness or 
Occidentalism requires the performative conjuration of the Orient. We can see this 
trend in the binaristic thinking that characterises Enlightenment humanism. 
Enlightenment humanism conjures a realm of inhuman unenlightened culture as 
though such a thing were simply there. However, the very notion of the 'human' is 
necessarily divided and 'other' to itself. 
Let us consider what has happened to the word 'Orientalism' itself: its iterability. 
It is clearly inaccurate to say that Said's way of thinking about Orientalism simply 
reflects the polysemy of language: it is not the case when Said uses the term that it 
reflects some other meaning in relation to some other context or set of objects. Rather, 
the reiteration of 'Orientalism' reflects how Orientalism's understanding of itself as a 
descriptive discipline shows it to be other to itself. We should also note that this 
understanding of Orientalism, which shows itself as other to itself, is not something 
that has simply been invented. Rather it was waiting in the wings to 'arrive' and show 
itself in this way as one of the future meanings of the term. The kind of 
deconstruction pertinent to the speech/writing distinction also applies to the supposed 
difference between the Occident and the Orient. The destruction of the 
Occident/Orient binary allows for the arrival of a new understanding of Orientalism. 
It should be noted that Said does not 'deconstruct' the opposition-this is not 
something that the reader/writer is in control of. It is something he/she bears witness 
to. 
ORIENTALISM WITHIN THE CURRICULUM 
In British schooling, the Orientalist approach to other cultures finds it crudest 
manifestation in the treatment of culture in terms of food, dress, customs etc. 
However, it takes a more complex form in relatively recent attempts to 
'accommodate' writing in English from other cultures into the curriculum. In some 
respects, we might see this as a form of progress, representative as it is, of an attempt 
to accommodate difference and handle a cultural realm that was previously excluded. 
However, the limitations of such a well-intentioned 'inclusive approach' can be noted 
in the National Curriculum for English in the distinction between courses of study 
based on an 'English Literary Heritage' and on 'Texts from different cultures and 
Traditions' : 
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English Literary Heritage 
2 Pupils should be taught 
a how and why texts have been influential and significant [for example, the 
influence of Greek myths, the Authorised version of the Bible, The Arthurian 
legends] 
b the characteristics of texts that are considered to be of high quality 
c the appeal and importance of these texts over time. 
Texts from different cultures and traditions 
3 Pupils should be taught: 
a to understand the values and assumptions in the texts 
b the significance of the subject matter and the language 
c the distinctive qualities of literature from different traditions 
d how familiar themes are explored in different cultural contexts [for example, 
how childhood is portrayed, references to oral or folk traditions] 
e to make connections and comparisons between texts from different cultures. 
One can easily see how the Orientalist conception of other cultures makes itself 
known in this document. Works from the English Literary Heritage must be 
'influential', 'significant' and 'high quality'. None of these factors play any part in the 
criteria for teaching texts from different cultures and traditions, and their absence 
speaks volumes. The word 'qualities' does appear but it is used in a 'descriptive' 
rather than 'evaluative' context. It is made clear to the reader that two different forms 
of study apply to texts from the English literary Heritage and Texts. from different 
cultures and traditions. As regards the former, the approach to such texts would 
resemble traditional forms of literary criticism, whilst the latter seems to combine 
anthropology with linguistics: 'pupils should be taught the significance of the subject 
matter and the language'. The English literary Heritage is influenced by 'myths' and 
'legends' which find their meagre infantilised equivalent in 'oral' or 'folk' 
traditions-the reference to the 'portrayal of childhood' is telling. 
What is perhaps most significant about this distinction between an English 
Literary Heritage and texts from other cultures and traditions is that it assumes some 
kind of absolute distinction between these two categories. This assumption fails to 
acknowledge the fact that so much writing in English from cultures beyond the 
geographical borders of Britain is a direct response to the English Literary Heritage 
and the Orientalist discourse that so often runs through it. If the conventions of the 
English language are reconfigured in these writings then the assumption that this is 
merely a local expression of dialect to be analysed is both naive and insulting. Instead 
we might see such texts as a means of writing back to a language/culture imposed 
through colonisation, giving words and structure a new resonance that does not 
simply repeat or reiterate the colonising power of older structures. 
The final insult to writing from other cultures manifests itself in the placing of the 
Poems From Other Cultures section within the GCSE exam7• The English GCSE is 
currently split into language and literature. It is no coincidence that the marks 
generated from this section contribute to the English language section of the paper. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is important to reiterate the point that many teachers and educationalists will see the 
inclusion of texts from other cultures and traditions within the curriculum as a 
progressive move. Equally, a progressive enthusiasm accompanies the various 
pedagogical strategies designed to accommodate difference. To see the injustice 
implicated in the binary distinction between a literary heritage and texts from other 
cultures, we must embrace the 'mad' or perverse workings of language, its difference 
to itself, its iterability. Of course, we would have no means of talking/writing about 
anything at all if it were not for the effects of presence-to imagine a language 
without such effects is to imagine linguistic chaos. To imagine linguistic chaos is to 
think from the perspective of linguistic' order', itself an effect of language. 
Our very status as speaking subjects, our subjectivity per se can be seen as an 
effect of language. We believe that we speak language and in doing so, have direct 
control over our words, yet language speaks us and does so by dividing up the world 
into different kinds of subjects. We might say that language exacts a kind of murder 
on its own wordness. The very fact that we come to believe in a metaphysical truth 
beyond language is an effect of the mark. Therefore, we might say that language in 
giving the effect of metaphysical presence to both subject and object generates a 
relationship in which its creations deny it and exact a form of Oedipal revenge on it, a 
move that ultimately results in blindness. Of course, this does not lead to the 
obliteration of the linguistic markness of language. Rather, that wordness or markness 
comes to haunt the speaking subj ect (and the metaphysics of presence per se) through 
differance/iterability. This 'hauntology' provides the space for talking back and 
welcoming the arrivant. If the educational establishment is to do justice to the arrivant 
and the differance prior to difference, then it must undergo a rigorous form of 
theoretical laser eye surgery. 
NOTES 
Phone (in Greek) means 'voice'. Logos means 'thought' or 'reason', understood here as 
immediately present to the mind. 
2 This quotation derives from new introduction that features in a more recent Preface to Gender 
Trouble. The first edition of Gender Trouble was published in 1990. 
3 It is worth saying something about the word 'conjuration'. 'To conjure' is literally and originally 'to 
swear together', but it commonly means 'to produce something out of nothing' . For example, a 
conjuror on the stage does a trick whereby he produces a bird out of an empty hat, as ifby magic. 
4 This is a slang expression meaning' destroy us' . 
5 The word 'nigger' has been seen as the most racist, most offensive term used to describe a black 
person. It has become customary (particularly within black American popular culture), however, for 
black people to refer to themselves and each other as 'niggers'. The term 'queer' was a standard 
term of abuse for gay people, but through the gay rights movement it was gradually appropriated 
and used by gay people themselves, now with positive connotations. Such instances reflect a kind of 
talking back as regards the language of oppression. 
6 This is a French word that is used in English, and it refers to someone who has newly arrived, 
probably unexpectedly, perhaps with a suggestion of ghostly presence. 
7 English/Welsh students take their GCSE exams at the age of 16. 
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